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SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL, DON'T GET SUED:
SHOULD A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
EXIST FOR A VIOLATION OF NASD
CONDUCT RULE 3010?
Amnon Wenger*
"The success of our securities markets is based on the high level of public
confidence inspired by a strong system of investor protection, and on the
entrepreneurial and innovative efforts of securities firms." 1
"Paying attention to little things that most men neglect makes a few men
2
rich."

The success of our securities markets depends on public confidence in
those markets.3 There are many rules and regulations imposed on those in
the securities industry to help protect investor confidence. 4 Among those
rules is the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") Rule
of Conduct 3010.5 Failure to follow the supervisory rules can cause one to
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. My thanks go to my mentors,
Jonathan Urestsky, Esq., and Michael Schwartzberg, Esq., for their inspiration and to
Professor and Executive Vice President of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. ("NASD"), George Friedman, for his assistance. Special thanks go to my daughter,
Leah, for being adorable and to my loving and dedicated wife, Ronit, for her love and
support.
1. Concerning FinancialModernization Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 165 (1999) [hereinafter Financial
Modernization Legislation] (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission).
2. Ubersite-Famous Quotes, http://www.ubersite.com/m/12589 (last visited Mar. 28,
2005).
3. See FinancialModernization Legislation, supra note 1, at 165 (statement of Arthur
Levitt).
4. Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940, at 98 (1989)
(noting that among the reasons for the passage of the securities acts was the perception that
"[i]t
was.., essential to restore [investor] confidence that had been badly shaken in... the
marketing of investment securities"). For rules that protect investor confidence, see
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000), and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78
(2000). For specific NASD rules that protect investors, see NASD, Inc., Rules of Conduct
2000-3520 (2005).
5. NASD, Inc., Rule of Conduct 3010. The Rule states, in applicable part, that "[e]ach
member shall establish and maintain a system to supervise the activities of each registered
representative and associated person that is reasonably designed to achieve compliance with
applicable securities laws and regulations, and with applicable NASD Rules. Final
responsibility for proper supervision shall rest with the member." Id. § 3010(a). The
remainder of the Rule details the minimum requirements for a supervisory system, as well as
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reach the opposite result of Henry Ford's statement above: 6 When the rich
men, or broker-dealers, neglect the little things (such as failing to
supervise), many men may go broke. 7 This Note explores the laws
surrounding broker-dealers' liability in relation to their obligation to
supervise the actions of their brokers. 8 Part I of this Note traces the
judiciary's historical attitude toward implying or denying private causes of
action, specifically in relation to violations of NASD rules. 9 It also details
the rampant industry practice of permitting these claims and the apparent
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") approval, or at least
acknowledgement, of this trend in arbitrations.' 0 Part II.A presents the
court decisions and policy arguments for not implying this private cause of
action,1 1 while Part II.B, by contrast, focuses on cases and reasons in
support of implying a private cause of action for violating the SEC's
supervisory rules. Finally, Part III proposes a direction that the law should
take and explains how best to implement a policy that removes the doubt
and uncertainty from the current securities laws. Part III also speculates as
to the future direction of law in this area.
I. IMPLYING PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Some background information is necessary to understand the issues
surrounding private causes of action with respect to securities. This part
presents an overview of the history of investor protections and private
remedies in securities law. 12 This part also looks at the difficulties faced by
courts deciding when and how to imply private causes of action. 13 Finally,
this part details the impact that arbitration policies and recent legislation
have had on the use of private causes of action for violations of the SEC
supervisory rules. 14

the written procedures, internal inspections, and review of transactions necessary to the
upkeep of a supervisory system. See id.
6. See Ubersite-Famous Quotes, http://www.ubersite.comml12589 (last visited Mar.

28, 2005).
7. It is axiomatic that if the securities industry saw fit to promulgate supervisory rules
following both the crash of 1929 and then again following the Enron collapse, the industry
did so in part to counter the perception that lack of supervision either contributed to, or could
in some way have further aggravated, those economic disasters. See generally J. Robert
Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies,
38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 317 (2004). "Sarbanes-Oxley arose out of this failure to impose

meaningful standards in the area of corporate governance ..... Id. at 320.
8. The term "broker-dealer" as used in this Note refers to the brokerage firm or
supervisors, whereas the term "broker" refers to the individual broker.
9. See infra Part I. There is no explicit statutory basis for allowing a private cause of
action for violations of the NASD supervisory rule. Traditionally, a court will imply a
private cause of action, though no explicit statutory action exists, when it is implicit from

either the text or congressional intent. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part I.B.5.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part I.B.1-4.
14. See infra Part I.B.5-6.
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A. Overview

The stock market crash of 1929 "prompted calls for reform."'1 5 Among
the numerous reforms was the creation of the SEC. 16 Congress established
the SEC in 1934 to "regulate the commerce in stocks, bonds, and other
securities." 17 During the post-crash Depression it was believed that lack of
regulation had allowed the perpetuation of fraud and thus contributed to the
crash.' 8 In response, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act" or "1933 Act"), which "required public corporations to
register their stock sales and distribution and make regular financial
disclosures"' 19 and "[t]he Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [which] created
the SEC to regulate exchanges, brokers, and over-the-counter markets, as
well as to monitor the required financial disclosures. '20
With the new rules came new questions of liability. Once there was a
body of law in place making certain types of conduct illegal, the question of
who was liable remained. 2 1 Although a broker who violated the law was
liable to his clients, investors wished to sue the deeper pockets of the
brokerage firms that employed the culpable broker. 22 Harmed investors,
therefore, sought out legal theories that would enable them to recover from
the brokerage firms.
There are many theories of liability that have been applied to hold
broker-dealers liable for the tortious or improper conduct of their
employees. These theories of liability include controlling person liability,
aiding and abetting, respondeat superior, and failure to supervise. 2 3 "The
question where that responsibility for supervision, and the liability for
failing to do so, begins and ends [is] subject to debate. '24 This Note
addresses that debate.
The 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"
or "1934 Act") do not explicitly authorize a private 25 cause of action for a
15. The Society of American Historians, The Reader's Companion to American History
976

(1991),

available

at

http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/rcah/htnil/ah_077800_securitiesan.htm
[hereinafter Society].
16. Cabell Phillips, From the Crash to the Blitz 1929-1939, at 140 (2000).
17. Society, supra note 15, at 976.
18. Id. But see James F. Willis & Martin L. Primack, An Economic History of the
United States 359-72 (2d ed. 1989) (detailing other possible causes of the Great Depression).
19. Society, supra note 15, at 976.
20. Id.
21. See David L. Ratner & Thomas Lee Hazen, Securities Regulation: Cases and
Materials 947 (4th ed. 1991).
22. See, e.g., Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980); Jablon v. Dean
Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980).
23. Dexter Johnson, Staying Out of Trouble with the SEC: Tips for the Brokerage Firm,

The LawHost Online, Fall 1998, http://www.lawhost.com/lawjournalU98fall/tips.html.
24. Id.
25. The term "private" does not "encompass enforcement actions by governmental
agencies or officers acting in the interest of whatever classes of the general public the statute
may be interpreted to have been designed to protect." Charles C. Marvel, Implication of

306
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violation of NASD rules. 26 The aforementioned causes of action may not
always be available depending on the jurisdiction 2 7 or circumstances
involved. 28 It would be convenient for those suing to be able to point to an
independent cause of action that arises from the brokerage firm's failure to
supervise its employees, thus eliminating the need to rely on blue-sky
laws, 29 respondeat superior, negligence and other similar theories. NASD
Conduct Rule 3010 details the supervisory requirements imposed upon
member firms to "establish and maintain a system to supervise the activities
of each registered representative and associated person that is reasonably
designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and
regulations, and with [the rules of the NASD]. ' ' 30 Thus, plaintiffs routinely
implore the courts to imply a private cause of action for violations of NASD
Conduct Rule 3010.31 The courts have attempted to reconcile plaintiffs'
32
requests with congressional intent.
B. Case Law: The Courts Tackle Implying Private Remedies
The various securities acts are "the principal governors of federal
securities law regulation." 33 Congress, when creating these guidelines, also
created a means of enforcement. 34 In some instances, Congress allowed for
its disciplinary body, the SEC, to have sole power to punish violators. 3 5 In
PrivateRight ofAction from Provisionof FederalStatute Not Expressly Providingfor One-

Supreme Court Cases, 61 L. Ed. 2d 910, 912-13 n.1 (2004).
26. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78
(2000).
27. See, e.g., Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating
that respondeat superior is precluded following the advent of controlling-person liability).
But see SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that
controlling-person liability was meant to "expand, rather than restrict, the scope of
liability"). For an excellent discussion of whether blue-sky laws are precluded, see David
M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998:
The Sun Sets on California'sBlue Sky Laws, 54 Bus. Law. 1, 14 (1998).
28. For example, controlling-person liability contains a good faith exception. See infra
notes 321-22 and accompanying text.
29. Blue-sky laws are specialized state statutes that, between 1911 and 1933, were
almost exclusively responsible for the regulation of securities sales in the United States.
Stefania A. Di Trolio, CorporateGovernance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Public Choice
Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side to Blue-Sky Laws, 30 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 1279,
1283 (2004). "State blue-sky laws were a response by the state legislatures to securities
fraud and other serious abuses in unregulated markets." Id. Blue-sky laws still play an
important role in enforcing securities regulation. Id. at 1314.
30. NASD, Inc., Rule of Conduct 3010 (2005).
31. Almost 6000 failure to supervise claims were brought in 2003 and 2004. NASD,
NASD
Statistics,
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=516&ssSourceNod
eld=12 (last visited July 1, 2005) [hereinafter Statistics].
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. Marc L. Steinberg, Securities Regulation 1 (4th ed. 2004).
34. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has the power to both administer
and enforce securities law. Id.
35. David L. Ratner, Securities Regulation: In a Nutshell 240-50 (6th ed. 1998). "The
1964 Securities Acts Amendments gave the Commission direct power to suspend or bar
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other instances, Congress expressly created a private cause of action,
allowing individuals to sue for damages, in addition to the penalties
imposed by the SEC. 36 The controversy arises in those situations-such as
37
failure to supervise-when there is no express private cause of action.
Did Congress really mean to deny the investor all means of recovery? Did
Congress merely intend to limit all means of recovery through litigation,
while allowing for the possibility of recovery through other avenues such as
arbitration? Or, although not explicitly mentioned, was Congress's intent
that private causes of action should be implied into the text of 38
the Act? The
courts have grappled with these questions for quite some time.
The history of implied private action remedies can be broken down into
two parts. First, there is the case law on the subject which can further be
broken down into two main eras: pre-1977 and post-1977. 39 Second, in
part due to the bulwark of securities cases bypassing the court system for
arbitration, there is the industry practice that has emerged separate from the
court system which allowed customers to bring failure to supervise
40
claims.
1. Traditional Views: Dispute Among the Circuits
Prior to the mid-1970s the courts were split on whether a private cause of
action could be implied for a violation of NASD rules. 4 1 Some courts had
said that in order to create a right of action there must be legislative intent
42
to create such a right.
In Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., Judge Henry J. Friendly
recognized that there could be no blanket rule covering all violations of
New York Stock Exchange and NASD rules. 4 3 Instead, Judge Friendly
held as follows:

from association with any broker-dealer any person who the Commission finds has

violated..

. the

1934 Act." Id. at 241.

Additionally, "[i]n 1990, Congress significantly

expanded the SEC's powers by giving it authority (a) to impose civil penalties... and/or
order disgorgement ... and (b) to issue cease and desist orders." Id.; see also infra notes

132-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Maloney Act and the NASD's jurisdictional
authority).

36. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77t (2000) (creating a private remedy for controlling-person
liability).

37. See infra Part I.B.1-4.
38. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975);
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969);
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966); Starkman v. Seroussi,

377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see infra Part
I.B.1-3.
39. Compare infra Part I.B.I, with infra Part I.B.2-4.
40. See infra Part I.B.5.
41. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
42. See Colonial Realty, 358 F.2d at 182 (explaining that courts must look at the nature
of the rule in relation to the regulatory scheme to determine if a remedy should be implied).

43. Id.
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What emerges is that whether the courts are to imply federal civil
liability for violation of exchange or dealer association rules by a member
cannot be determined on the simplistic all-or-nothing basis urged by the
two parties; rather, the court must look to the nature of the particular rule
and its place in the regulatory scheme, with the party urging the
implication of a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of
persuasion than when the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation.
The case for implication would be strongest when the rule imposes an
explicit duty unknown to the common law.an

Other courts allowed the implication provided that the rule was intended
to protect investors. 4 5 In Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, the court found that even
if an exchange or self-regulatory organization ("SRO") rule had two
functions-a "non-actionable 'housekeeping' function" and a "public

protection function"-a violation
of the rule would be actionable under the
"public protection function." 4 6 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, quoting the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in J.L Case Co. v.
Borak,47 said that "[p]rivate enforcement . . . provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action.... [T]he possibility of civil damages..
. serves as a most effective weapon. '48 In the mid-1970s, the Supreme
49
Court stepped in to settle the debate.
2. Courts Begin Restricting Private Remedies
In 1975, the Supreme Court recognized, in limited form, that private
rights of action with respect to securities laws could be implied. 50 In Cort
v. Ash, 51 the Court detailed the criteria needed to imply a private cause of
action.52 The Court stated that "[i]n determining whether a private remedy
is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are
relevant. '5 3 First, a court should determine whether "the plaintiff [is] 'one
44. Id.
45. Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Private Federal Right of Action Against
Brokerage Firm for Violation of Exchange or Dealer Association Rule, 54 A.L.R. Fed. 11
(1981) (updated April 2002); see, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 141-43 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that enactment of New York Stock
Exchange Rule 405 may have been for the protection of investors); Starkman v. Seroussi,
377 F. Supp. 518, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that New York Stock Exchange Rule 405
"is aimed at protecting the customer from being drawn into questionable transactions or
speculative activities far beyond his purse," and therefore allowing implication); cf Carras v.
Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding that since margin maintenance
requirements "were not promulgated for the protection of investors, they create no cause of
action").
46. Buttrey, 410 F.2d at 141.
47. 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
48. Buttrey, 410 F.2d at 142 (quoting Borak, 377 U.S. at 432).
49. See infra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
50. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 78.

53. Id.

It should be pointed out here that Cort, and the two subsequent cases,

TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), and Touche Ross & Co.
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of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted' .

.

. that is,

does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff."'54 Next,
courts should ask if there is "any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one." 55 The third factor
is whether implying the cause of action is "consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme." 56 Lastly, courts should consider
whether the cause of action is "one traditionally relegated to state law,"
making it "inappropriate" to imply a federal cause of action. 57 The Court
noted, however, that the "provision of a criminal penalty does not
necessarily58 preclude implication of a private cause of action for
damages."
The validity of the Cort test soon came under criticism. In two 1979
cases, the Supreme Court reanalyzed the standard for implying private
actions. In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,59 the Court
answered the question of whether the Investment Advisors Act of 194060
created "a private cause of action for damages or other relief in favor of
persons aggrieved by those who allegedly have violated it."'6 1 The Court
first recognized that there is no explicit cause of action created by the Act,
but rather the Act only expressly permits the SEC to bring suit to enjoin
violations. 62 The plaintiffs argued that "clients of investment advisers were
the intended beneficiaries of the Act and that courts should therefore imply
a private cause of action in their favor." 63 Rather than run the Investment
Advisors Act through the four-factor test enumerated in Cort, the Court
64
dismissed that test and focused strictly on congressional intent.
Interestingly, the Court did not deem silence in the legislative history fatal
to proving intent, as such intent may "appear implicitly in the language or
65
structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment.
However, the Court was persuaded that where a statute expressly provides
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), all relate to implying private causes of action directly
from the statute. My discussion, implying private causes of action for violations due to
failure to supervise, has no direct statutory basis, but, rather, is implied from a violation of
self-regulatory organization ("SRO") rules. For a more in-depth discussion of this process,
see infra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
54. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)
(emphasis omitted)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 79 (emphasis omitted).
59. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
60. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2000).
61. Transamerica,444 U.S. at 13.

62. Id. at 14.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 15-16 ("While some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis
upon the desirability of implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies
thought to effectuate the purpose[] .. . what must ultimately be determined is whether
Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted.").
65. Id. at 18.
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for a remedy, a court should not read others into it.6 6 "The mere fact that
[a] statute was designed to protect advisers' clients does not require the
'67
implication of a private cause of action for damages on their behalf."
Similarly, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,68 the Court held that
customers of securities brokerage firms did not have an implied private
cause of action under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.69 The Court recognized that the "existence of a statutory cause of
action is ... one of statutory construction." 70 The Court agreed with the
Cort decision in that "the fact that a federal statute has been violated and
some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of
action in favor of that person." 7 1 In a departure from the four-factor test of
Cort, the Touche Ross Court found that "our task is limited solely to
determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action
asserted. '7 2 The Court further recognized, in regard to section 17(a), that
"the legislative history of the 1934 Act is entirely silent on the question
whether a private right of action for damages should or should not be
available." 73 The Court also acknowledged the dangers inherent in
implying causes of action from silence: "[I]mplying a private right of
action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at
best."'74 The Ninth Circuit later applied this principle to the specific
75
question of implying private remedies for a violation of a NASD rule.
3. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co. :76 Applying Transamericaand Touche
Ross to NASD Rule Violations
In 1980, shortly after the Transamerica and Touche Ross decisions, the
Ninth Circuit specifically extended the logic upon which those cases were
77
based to the realm of New York Stock Exchange rules and NASD rules.
In Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., the court questioned whether a private
66. Id. at 19.
67. Id. at 24.
68. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
69. Id. Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 details the record-keeping
and reporting obligations imposed on any "national securities exchange, member thereof,
broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such
member, registered securities association, registered broker or dealer, registered municipal
securities dealer, registered securities information processor, registered transfer agent, and
registered clearing agency and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board." 15 U.S.C. §
78q(a) (2000).
70. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568. As an interesting answer to proponents of implying
private rights of actions based on tort principles, the Court held that the argument "in favor
of implication of a private right of action based on tort principles.., is entirely misplaced."
Id.
71. Id. at 567 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 571.
74. Id.
75. See infra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
76. 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980).
77. Id.
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cause of action existed for violations of New York Stock Exchange and
NASD rules, 78 noting that the Supreme Court rulings "reflect[ed] a
restrictive approach to implying private rights of action. ' 79 The court held
that, "[ajlthough those cases involved statutes rather than stock exchange
[or NASD] rules, we think the same approach should apply in this case." 80
The test that the Ninth Circuit used is actually stricter than that utilized by
the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit held as follows:
Because the stock exchange rules were not enacted by Congress but by
the exchange acting on authority delegated by Congress, a two-step
inquiry is necessary: (1) whether Congress intended to delegate authority
to establish rules implying a private right of action; (2) whether the stock
exchange8 rules were drafted such that a private action may legitimately be
implied. '
The Ninth Circuit never reached the question of whether New York
Stock Exchange or NASD rules were legitimately implied, instead
hamstringing the entire argument by holding "that Congress did not intend
82
to create private rights of action for violation of stock exchange rules."
Instead, the Jablon court analyzed the New York Stock Exchange question
and the NASD question separately. 83 With regard to the New York Stock
Exchange rules, the Ninth Circuit held that the "Securities Exchange Act
does not expressly authorize private actions for stock exchange rule
violations." 84 After reviewing the reasons traditionally listed for implying a
private cause of action, the court concluded that in light of the recent
"restrictive approach to implying private rights of action," those reasons are
85
no longer valid.
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the NASD Rules. The court first ruled
out any possible interpretation that the right could be explicit. 86 The
petitioner argued that "a private right is implicit because § 15A(b)(6) of the
Securities Exchange Act, requiring a stock association to adopt
disciplinary rules, establishes an actionable duty under § 27."87 The Ninth
78. The specific rules allegedly violated in Jablon were the New York Stock Exchange
"know your customer" rule, the NASD "suitability" rule, and SEC Rule lOb-5. Id. at 678.
79. Id. at 679.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id. Because the court held that the suit failed the initial prong, it never reached the
second prong of the test for determining whether the SEC intended to create a private action.
Cf id.
83. Id.

84. Id.
85. Id. After establishing that the only determinative factor is congressional intent, the
court found that a private cause of action could not be implied "[blecause we find no
congressional intent to provide a private action for violation of stock exchange rules." Id. at
681.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citation omitted). Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a
catchall provision granting the "district courts . . . exclusive jurisdiction of violations of...
the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by" the securities acts. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000).
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Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court, held that an implied private action
cannot be based on section 27.88 It also held that section 15A(b)(6) does
not "in itself imply that Congress intended to create a private action. Its
language, like that of sections 6(b) 89 and 17(a) 90 of the Securities Exchange
Act, 'neither confers rights on private parties nor proscribes any conduct as
unlawful."' 9 1 Additionally, the court found it compelling that no explicit
cause of action was given, especially
when other parts of the Exchange Act
92
specifically provide as such.
The last bastion of implied private remedies in securities litigation
remained in cases involving fraud, where courts consistently implied
private causes of action through SEC Rule lOb-5, 93 the implementing rule
94
under the general antifraud provision of Exchange Act section 10(b).
Courts and commentators postulated the following:
Although it has been contended that Congress intended to confine any
enforcement of benefits secured to private parties to actions by the SEC
by way of injunction or criminal prosecution, on the grounds of the
existence of the express civil liability clauses of the Exchange Act, such a
contention has been uniformly rejected, and there now can be no doubt as
to the existence of civil liability [with respect to Rule lOb-5].95
It was through Rule lOb-5 that the concept of implying private causes of
action had remained a viable pleading in cases. 96 But even with Rule lOb88. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 680.
89. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 6(b), establishes the registration
requirements for a securities exchanges and their members. 15 U.S.C. § 78f.
90. See id.
91. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 681 (quoting Touche Ross v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 569
(1979)).
92. Id.
Our conclusion that neither § 6(b) nor § 15A(b)(6) provides private rights of
action is further supported by the fact that sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act explicitly provide private rights of action. The Supreme
Court found no implied private action under § 17(a) of the Act because "when
Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so and
did so expressly."
Id. (quoting Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 572). The court went even further, stating, "We
believe.., it highly improbable that Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended
private action in either § 6(b) or § 15A(b)(6)." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). "Rule lOb-5 is the leading anti-fraud weapon in the
federal securities laws." Donna M. Nagy et al., Securities Litigation and Enforcement 19
(2003). Rule lob-5 covers material misstatements and omissions. Id. Most of the recent
highly publicized accounting scandals at WorldCom, Xerox, Enron, and others have
involved Rule lOb-5 infractions. Id. at 24.
94. See 69A Am. Jur. 2d Securities Regulation-Federal§ 935 (1993). Rule lOb-5
makes it unlawful to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." 17 C.F.R. §
240. 1Ob-5(a) (2004).
95. Securities Regulation-Federal,supra note 94, § 935 (citing Gilbert v. Nixon, 429
F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968)).
96. Id. Interestingly, neither the drafter of Rule lOb-5, Milton Freeman, nor the SEC,
envisioned creating an implied private fight of action under Rule lOb-5. See Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975); William T. Allen & Reiner
Kraakman, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization 590 (2003).
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5, where there "can be no doubt, ' 97 the Supreme Court curtailed the
expansive application of this right in the landmark
case of Central Bank of
98
Denver v. FirstInterstate Bank of Denver.
4. Courts Embrace Complete Textualism
In Central Bank, the Court struck a blow to proponents of implying
private causes of action. 99 The question in Central Bank was "whether
private civil liability under § 10(b) extends as well to those who do not
engage in the manipulative or deceptive practice, but who aid and abet the
violation."1 00 The Court noted that in the past it had only allowed implied
causes of action for certain provisions of the Exchange Act, specifically "by
the terms of §§ 10(b) and 14(a) of the 1934 Act."10 1 Touting the same
argument, that if Congress intended to create a private cause of action it
would have done so explicitly, the Court declined to imply a private cause
of action. 10 2 In stark language the Court chided, "Congress knew how to
impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do SO." ' 10 3 The Court
continued, "[i]f, as respondents seem to say, Congress intended to impose

Milton Freeman famously recounted the hurried events leading to the promulgation of Rule
10b-5:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the S.E.C.
building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was then the
director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on the
telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in
Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company in Boston who
is going around buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders at
$4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly,
whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share
for the coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he came upstairs
and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section
17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in
connection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the
end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember
whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper
around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner
Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?"
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 767 (citing Conference on Codification of the Federal
Securities Law, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967)).
97. Securities Regulation-Federal,supra note 94, § 935 (citing Gilbert, 429 F.2d at
348; Heit, 402 F.2d at 909).
98. 511U.S. 164, 167 (1994).
99. Id. at 185.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 171 (citing Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971)); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-35 (1964).
102. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 185, 192-93.
103. Id. at 176-77 (citations omitted).
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aiding and abetting liability, we presume it would have used the words 'aid'
and 'abet' in the statutory text. But it did not."'1 4
More recently, the Court has again come down on the side of restricting
implied private causes of action. In Alexander v. Sandoval,10 5 the Court
held as follows:
Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce
federal law must be created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret
the statute that Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an
intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy ...
Without [such intent], a cause of action does not exist and courts may not
create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or
how compatible with the statute....

...In determining whether statutes create private rights of action...
legal context matters only to [the] extent it clarifies text.... Statutes that
focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create
"no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of
persons."' 106
The Court defined the class used in determining whether a federal right
of action existed even more narrowly in Gonzaga University v. Doe. 10 7 The
Court determined that "where a statute does not include this sort of explicit
'right- or duty-creating language' ... [the Court] rarely impute[s] to
10 8
Congress intent to create a private right of action."
Despite consistent precedent limiting and disallowing private rights of
action in litigation, the law remains unsettled because plaintiffs have
consistently chosen to seek redress through arbitration. 109
5. Arbitrating Failure to Supervise Claims: How Arbitration Differs from
Litigation
As courts have restricted the ability of harmed investors to seek redress
1 10
through litigation, these investors increasingly have turned to arbitration.
This avenue has not always been available for claims based on the 1933 and
1934 Acts. 11I In Wilko v. Swan, 112 the Supreme Court held that arbitration
104. Id. (internal citations omitted); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988) ("When
Congress wished to create such liability, it had little trouble doing so."); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975) ("When Congress wished to provide a
remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble in doing so
expressly.").
105. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 286-89 (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)).
536 U.S. 273 (2002).
Id. at 284 n.3.
Statistics, supra note 31.
Id.
See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,438 (1953).
Id.
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was unavailable for claims based on the Securities Acts because they
severely undercut a hanned investor's ability to recover under those
Acts."13 The Court noted that section 14 of the 1933 Act "void[s] any
'stipulation' waiving compliance with any 'provision' of the Securities Act.
[An] arrangement to arbitrate is a 'stipulation,' and we think the right to
select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived
under § 14 of the Securities Act."1 14 The underlying reason for the Wilko
5
decision was that arbitrations were generally disadvantageous to buyers."1
In 1967, the Court changed its attitude towards arbitration.11 6 In Prima
Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the Court stated that there is
a strong public policy in favor of arbitration. 1 17 It has now become well
established that the Federal Arbitration
Act 118 establishes a strong national
119
policy in favor of arbitration.
In 1987, the Court specifically held that disputes arising under the 1933
and 1934 Acts are subject to arbitration. 120 While the Court declined to
expressly overrule Wilko, it severely limited the holding to its facts. 12 1 The
Court held that
the mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in
1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has
prevailed since that time. This is especially so in light of the intervening
changes in the regulatory structure of the securities laws. Even if Wilko's
assumptions regarding arbitration were valid at the time Wilko was
decided, most certainly they do not hold true today
for arbitration
22
procedures subject to the SEC's oversight authority.
Though the Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon decision did
not expressly overturn Wilko, it was incongruous for the two decisions to
exist simultaneously. 123 In 1989, the Court recognized this incongruity and

113. Id.
114. Id. at434-35.

115. Id. at 435-36. "Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to
the buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration as compared to
judicial proceedings." Id. at 435.
116. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)
(stating the public policy support for arbitration).
117. Id.

118. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
119. Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
"The Federal Arbitration Act was designed to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to
enforce agreements to arbitrate, and place such agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts." Id. (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Moses H. Cone Mem'l. Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding that the Arbitration Act establishes
a "federal policy favoring arbitration").
120. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
121. Id.

122. Id. at 233.
123. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(explaining the incongruity between the Wilko and McMahon decisions).
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expressly overruled Wilko. 124 Finding that "Wilko was incorrectly decided
and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal
statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business
transactions," the Court established arbitration
as the prevailing policy even
125
for violations of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
In the aftermath of the Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc. 126 and McMahon1 27 decisions, which held that federal
securities acts claims could be arbitrated, the brokerage firms fully endorsed
arbitration, resulting in arbitration clauses in virtually all customer-broker
agreements. 128 The investing public used arbitration as a way to settle
claims. 129 Today, failure to supervise claims are among the most frequently
raised claims in NASD arbitrations. 130 The basis for raising such claims in
an arbitration setting is evident in the historical
development of the failure
13 1
to supervise claims and securities arbitration.
The Maloney Act Amendments to the 1934 Act require that brokerdealers be members of a national securities association 132 or be associated
with one. 13 3 The 1975 amendments to the 1934 Act vested in the SEC
powers of oversight over SRO arbitration programs. 134 If either the SEC,
using its oversight powers over arbitration, 135 or the NASD, which all
broker-dealers are either members of or associated with, 136 allows failure to
supervise claims in arbitration then there is a strong presumption that the
courts will uphold the ruling given the wide deference given to
arbitration. 137

124. Id.
125. See id.

126. Id. at 477.
127. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
128. See Statistics, supra note 31.
129. See id.

130. In 2003, 3230 failure to supervise claims were brought, making it the fourth largest
type of claim brought. Id.
131. See infra notes 132-50 and accompanying text.
132. As of the date of this publication, the NASD is the only qualified national securities
association.
133. Maloney Act, Pub. L. No. 719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2000).
135. Id.

136. See 52 Stat. at 1070.
137. See supra note 119 and accompanying text; see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (noting that "we have recognized that federal statutory
claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitration, and we have enforced agreements
to arbitrate that involve such claims"); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (stressing "the strong language of the Arbitration Act, which
declares as a matter of federal law that arbitration agreements 'shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract"' (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982))).
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The NASD permits, but does not require, that members make use of
arbitration clauses. 138 Many members do use them1 3 9 and their content is
regulated by the NASD to protect investors from unfair arbitration
clauses. 140 The typical arbitration clause is very broad and may encompass
failure to supervise claims. 141
The NASD, pursuant to requests for cheaper litigation, promulgated
NASD Rule 10301.142 Rule 10301 applies when there is no arbitration
clause and mandates that
any dispute, claim, or controversy eligible for submission under the Rule
10100 Series between a customer and a member and/or associated person
arising in connection with the business of such member or in connection
with the activities of such associated persons shall be arbitrated under this
Code, as provided by any duly executed and enforceable written
143
agreement or upon the demand of the customer.

The phrase "arising in connection with the business" is very broad and
could encompass a violation of NASD rules, including failure to
supervise. 144 Thus under the Court's recent interpretations of the Federal
Arbitration Act, if an arbitration agreement is in place, a plaintiff will be
145
able to arbitrate a failure to supervise claim.
The NASD and SEC gave further credence to the practice of allowing
private causes of action in arbitrations, specifically in connection with
failure to supervise claims, through a NASD Notice to Members.' 46 The
NASD Notice to Members 99-90 stated that the SEC "approved the use of
138. NASD,
Arbitration,
http://www.nasd.com/stellent/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=523&ssSourceN
odeld=887 (last visited Jul. 1, 2005).
139. See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Follow-up Report on Matters Relating to
Securities Arbitration (2003) ("[Mlost broker-dealers require customers, when opening an
account, to sign a customer agreement that includes a predispute arbitration clause.").
140. See NASD, Inc., Rule of Conduct 3110(f); see also Notices, 69 Fed. Reg. 232 (Dec.
3, 2004). The SEC, in response to complaints that investors are not adequately forewarned
of the effects of arbitration, recently added stricter disclosure rules regarding the content of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Id.
141. See NASD, Inc., Rule of Conduct 3110(f); see also Notices, 69 Fed. Reg. 232,
(listing rule filings governing the content of arbitration clauses in customer-broker
agreements).
142. See NASD, Inc., Rule of Procedure
10301 (2001), available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/ display/index.html.
143. Id.
144. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
issued instruction on the scope of NASD Rule 10301. See Vestax Secs. Corp. v. McWood,
280 F.3d 1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 2002). In USAllianz Secs., Inc. v. S. Mich. Bancorp, Inc., the
court, relying on the Vestax decision, held that "a dispute that arises from a firm's lack of
supervision 'arises in connection with its business' under NASD Rule 10301(a)." 290 F.
Supp. 2d 827, 830 (W.D. Mich. 2003); see also IFG Network Secs. v. King, 282 F. Supp. 2d
1344, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
145. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
146. NASD, Inc., Notice to Members 99-90, at 687 (Nov. 1999), available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/notice to-members/nasdw_005118.
pdf.
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the Discovery Guide ... in National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.... arbitration proceedings involving customer disputes with firms and
associated persons." 1 4 7 The Discovery Guide is meant to "provide[]
guidance to parties on which documents they should exchange without
arbitrator or staff intervention."' 148 List 5 and List 6 pertain only to private
claims of failure to supervise." 4 9 The Notice specifies that the production
150
list is "intended for use by arbitrators in customer arbitrations only,"
clearly differentiating this from an SEC enforcement proceeding. Thus, the
SEC and NASD allow a private cause of action for violation of Rule 3010,
15 1
even though the Supreme Court's logic in the Central Bank,
152
153
Transamerica, and Touche Ross
decisions denied the remedy in
154
litigation.
This Note seeks to address this contradiction. The law on this
issue has become particularly unsettled in light of the securities laws passed
in recent years in the wake of the accounting scandals.

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
152. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
153. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
154. The question remains why, if the courts have consistently ruled that there is no
private cause of action in litigation, a broker-dealer should object to an unfavorable award in
arbitration. Even if an unfavorable award is issued, the defendant can appeal the arbitration
and have the award vacated. The answer lies in the dangers of arbitration. Notwithstanding
the additional cost of having to appeal the result of an arbitration following an improper
award, there are two problems with allowing the claim to even be raised in arbitration. First,
an arbitration panel is not required to state any ground for its opinion. See NASD, Inc., Rule
of Procedure 10330. It is sufficient merely to detail the decision. Id. Secondly, even if an
arbitration panel explicitly said that the award was based only on violation of the failure to
supervise, the standard for vacating is quite high and varies depending on the jurisdiction.
See Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F. Supp. 719, 726 (N.D. Tex. 1997). "The standard of
review for arbitration awards has been described as 'among the narrowest known to the
law."' Id. (citation omitted); see also Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2004).
A motion to vacate filed in a federal court is not an occasion for de novo review of
an arbitral award. "It is well established that courts must grant an arbitration
panel's decision great deference. A party petitioning a federal court to vacate an
arbitral award bears the heavy burden of showing that the award falls within a very
narrow set of circumstances delineated by statute and case law."
Id. (quoting Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 388
(2d. Cir. 2003)). In New York, if the defendant proved the high standard of "manifest
disregard of the law," it would justify vacating the award, assuming there were no other
viable way to uphold the award, even using logic not relied upon by the arbitration panel.
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir.
1986). Not all courts have followed this reasoning. See Mantle, 956 F. Supp. at 726-27
("Some courts have also considered 'manifest disregard of the law' as a proper basis for
vacating an award. The Fifth Circuit holds, however, that § 10 of the Federal Aribtration
Act sets forth the exclusive grounds on which vacatur may be founded." (citing Mcllroy v.
PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam))).
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6. Recent Litigation Reopens the Debate

Following the Enron, WorldCom, and other accounting scandals,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.155 Although omitted
from the final text of the Act, representatives discussed enhancing the
abilities of private litigants to enforce securities claims. 156 Thus, while an
express private cause of action is not yet forthcoming, the debate is still
raging. 157
1-. SHOULD A PRIVATE REMEDY EXIST FOR VIOLATIONS OF NASD RULE

3010?
This part analyzes the interplay of the case law, industry practice, policy,
and emerging legislation that affect whether a private action remedy should
exist for violation of failure to supervise rules. Part II.A details the reasons
against implying a private right of action. Specifically, Part I.A details the
ample court decisions against implying a private right of action, discusses
the industry norm of claiming failure to supervise in arbitrations, and
analyzes the policy considerations that underlie the jurisprudence. Part I.A
also asserts reasons for the continued denial of the implied right in light of
recent litigation. Part II.B, by contrast, focuses on reasons for implying a
private cause of action for violation of failure to supervise rules. Part 11.B
analyzes case law supporting implication, as well as industry practice, the
policy issues at play, and the impact that recent legislation has on this issue.
A. Cases and PoliciesAdvocating that There Should Not Be a Private
Cause ofAction for Violation of the Failureto Supervise Rule
This part analyzes the case law, which overwhelmingly supports denying
private remedies. 15 8 It also discusses the policy considerations that underlie
the decisions. Finally, it examines the impact that the Sarbanes-Oxley bill
has on this issue.
1. Certain Case Law Supports Denying a Private Remedy
Over the past twenty-five years, judicial decisions show a progression
toward a more textualist approach. 15 9 This part tracks the initial split
among the circuit courts on this issue, 160 the Supreme Court's initial move
toward textualism, 16 1 the Ninth Circuit's application of textualism to the

155. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.)
745 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
156. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Implied PrivateActions Under SarbanesOxley, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 775, 781 (2004).
157. See infra notes 332-42 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 178-217 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 178-217 and accompanying text.
160. See infra Part II.A.l.a.
161. See infra Part II.A.l.b.
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question of violations of NASD rules, 16 2 as well as the Court's
16 3
revolutionary embrace of textualism in a Rule 10b-5 setting.
Additionally, this part explains the role arbitration has in judicial decision164
making.
a. Seeds for Denial
Before Cort v. Ash, 165 courts were split on whether and under what
conditions a private cause of action could be implied. 166 Under the rule laid
down in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. 16 7 by Judge Friendly, a
private right of action does not exist because the duty to supervise rule is
not "an explicit duty unknown to the common law," 168 but rather should be
to imply a
regulated on other levels. 169 After Cort, analyzing whether 170
private fight of action depended on applying the four-factor test.
Based on the aforementioned criteria, it is unclear whether a private
cause of action should be implied for violation of the failure to supervise
rule. Cort gave no indication of how to weigh the four factors. 17 1 While
proponents of implying a remedy could argue that the securities acts, upon
which a failure to supervise claim is at least tangentially based, 172 were
designed for the protection of investors, 173 opponents could counter by
arguing that there is no indication whether this factor, standing alone, is
sufficient. There is no explicit textual support for implying the private
action, arguably the most dominant factor in the Cort test as evidenced by
the subsequent Transamerica and Touche Ross decisions. 174 Opponents of
the remedy argue that implying a cause of action is not "consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme." 1 75 Lastly, the cause of
action is "one traditionally relegated to state law,"'176 because one could sue

162. See infra Part II.A.l.c.
163. See infra Part II.A.l.d.
164. See infra Part II.A.l.e.

165. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
166. See supra Part I.B.1.

167. 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966).
168. Id.

169. For example, it could be regulated through tort principles, respondeat superior, or
conspiracy. See infra notes 254-67 and accompanying text.
170. See supra Part I.B.2.

171. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
172. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that some
proponents for implying remedies for a violation of exchange rules found basis in the
securities statutes); see also Securities Regulation-Federal,supra note 94, § 1605.

173. See Securities Industry Association, Comprehensive Investor Protection Statutes,
http://www.sia.com/capitol-hill/html/protectionstatutes.html (last visited July 2, 2005).
174. Without an indication of how to weigh the four factors, projecting how a court
would decide each individual case is conjecture.
175. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
176. Id.
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under the theory of respondeat superior, a state law action. 177 Thus, Cort
does not provide adequate evidence for either side.
b. The Court Embraces a Textual Approach to Implying Causes of Action
Regardless of whether a private cause of action would be implied under
Cort, the Supreme Court decisions in Transamerica178 and Touche Ross 179
essentially shut the door on the issue of whether a private right of action
could be implied for violation of the failure to supervise rule. 180 Rather
than following the full four-factor test, the two decisions focused
exclusively on congressional intent. 18 1 The intent, which must "appear
implicitly in the language or structure of the statute, or in the circumstances
of its enactment," cannot support implication of the remedy. 182 Even
though it is conceded that the act was to benefit investors, this is an
insufficient reason to imply a remedy. 183 "[T]he mere fact that [a] statute
was designed to protect advisers' clients does not require implication of a
private cause on their behalf."' 184 Instead, the sole task is to determine
"whether Congress intended to create the private right."' 185 Additionally,
the silence in the legislative history that the Court found so compelling in
Touche Ross186 exists here when trying to imply a cause of action regarding
failure to supervise. 187 Therefore, under the Transamericaand the Touche
188
Ross standards, a private cause of action should not be implied.
177. For examples of persons suing in state court for respondeat superior in addition to
failure to supervise, see Champion Parts, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 878 F.2d 1003 (7th
Cir. 1989); Carroll v. John Hancock Distribs., No. 92-5907, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3077
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1994); Borchers v. DBL Liquidating Trust (In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc.), 161 B.R. 902 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
178. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
179. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
180. See Ryan v. Illinois, No. 91 C 3725, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5160 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17,
1996). The court in Ryan noted the following:
In Thompson v. Thompson, Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion that the
Supreme Court effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis. The
Supreme Court in Thompson held that unless the legislative intent can be inferred
from the language of the statute, or some other source, a private remedy will not be
implied.
Id. (citations omitted).
181. Transamerica,444 U.S. at 23-24; Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568.
182. Transamerica,444 U.S. at 18.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
185. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568.
186. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
187. Failure to supervise is completely absent from legislation. Instead it is an NASD
rule. See NASD, Inc., Rule of Conduct 3010.
188. Some commentators stated in the wake of those decisions "that although the
decisions in Touche Ross and Transamerica are restrictive in terms of implying private
federal rights of action under statutes which do not provide a right of action, they should not
be viewed as foreclosing the possibility of future judicial inference." Eichelberger, supra
note 45, § 2 (citing Mark I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action under Federal Law,
55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 33 (1979)). This statement did not prove to be entirely prescient.
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c. Courts Reject Private Causes of Action for Violations of NASD Rules
The previous three cases dealt with implying private causes of action
directly from a statute. Under that analysis, using the Cort test, it would be
possible to imply a plivate cause of action, 189 whereas if one uses the
"intent" test, it would be unclear whether a private cause of action could be
implied. 19 0 Applying the Court's analysis to supervisory rules may be
further complicated because the failure to supervise rule is not actually
embodied in a statute but is just a Conduct Rule. 19 1 To imply a private
cause of action here, it is necessary to argue that "[a]lthough the rules of the
[NASD] are not federal statutes.., they are equivalent to federal statutes
because they were enacted by the NASD pursuant to its rulemaking powers
under § 15A(b)(6) and § 19(g) of the Exchange Act.' 9 2 This argument is
difficult in light of the Transamerica decision holding that if a statute
Subsequent decisions refused to imply rights of action in the Second, Third, and Ninth
Circuits. Id. Even the courts unwilling to make a blanket rule "have stated that the party
urging the implication of a federal right of action for violation of an exchange or NASD rule
carries a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when the violation is of the
Securities Exchange Act or of a Securities Exchange Commission regulation." Id.
189. See supra Part II.A.l.a.
190. See supra Part II.A.l.b.
191. See NASD, Inc., Rule of Conduct 3010.
192. Securities Regulation-Federal,supra note 94, § 1605. The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 states as follows:
(b) Determinations by Commission requisite to registration of applicant as national
securities association. An association of brokers and dealers shall not be registered
as a national securities association unless the Commission determines that(6) The rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade,
to foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating,
clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating
transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of
a free and open market and a national market system, and, in general, to protect
investors and the public interest; and are not designed to permit unfair
discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, to fix minimum
profits, to impose any schedule or fix rates of commissions, allowances, discounts,
or other fees to be charged by its members, or to regulate by virtue of any authority
conferred by this [title] matters not related to the purposes of this [title] or the
administration of the association.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78s. The statute also states the following:
(g) Compliance with rules and regulations.
(1) Every self-regulatory organization shall comply with the provisions of this
chapter, the rules and regulations thereunder, and its own rules, and (subject to the
provisions of section 78q(d) of this title, paragraph
(2) of this subsection, and the rules thereunder) absent reasonable justification or
excuse enforce compliance(A) in the case of a national securities exchange, with such provisions by its
members and persons associated with its members; (B) in the case of a registered
securities association, with such provisions and the provisions of the rules of the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board by its members and persons associated
with its members; and (C) in the case of a registered clearing agency, with its own
rules by its participants.
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expressly provides a remedy, as the rulemaking compliance statute does, 193
a court should not imply one. 194 Additionally, several courts have
specifically stated that a violation of NASD rules, or in similarly related
cases, violation of exchange rules, does not create a private cause of
action. 195
In Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 19 6 the Ninth Circuit specifically
answered the question of whether to imply a private right of action for a
violation of NASD rules, addressing the issue in a post-Transamericaand
Touche Ross framework. The Jablon court, forced to apply Transamerica
and Touche Ross to the more indirect scenario of implying a cause of action
for the violation of an NASD rule-which can only be said to have a
statutory basis indirectly by implying a cause of action through the
Exchange Act-added an extra layer of testing that made it even more
difficult to imply a private cause of action. 197 The Ninth Circuit said that
[b]ecause the stock exchange rules were not enacted by Congress but by
the exchange acting on authority delegated by Congress, a two-step
inquiry is necessary: (1) whether Congress intended to delegate authority
to establish rules implying a private right of action; (2) whether the stock
exchange rules were drafted such that a private action may legitimately be
implied. 198

The Ninth Circuit then conducted the first prong of its analysis and found
"that Congress did not intend to create private rights of action for violation
of stock exchange rules."' 99 The Jablon court equated the New York Stock
193. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states the following:
The rules of the association provide that (subject to any rule or order of the
Commission pursuant to section 78q(d) or 78s(g)(2) of this title) its members and
persons associated with its members shall be appropriately disciplined for violation
of any provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, the rules of the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or the rules of the association, by
expulsion, suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and operations, fine,
censure, being suspended or barred from being associated with a member, or any
other fitting sanction.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2000).
194. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (noting that
"it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a
particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it").
195. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980); Birotte v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (D.N.J. 1979) ("Rule 405
simply does not meet the second and third parts of the Cort guidelines; that is, there is no
indication that Congress intended to create a remedy for violation of these rules, and
implication of such a remedy would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme."). But see
Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160 (8th Cir. 1977) (allowing
implication of a private right of action for violation of exchange rules in the limited cases
where there is a finding of fraud).
196. 614 F.2d at 677.
197. The additional layer required determining whether Congress intended to delegate the
authority to establish rules implying private remedies. Id. at 679. This is the first step of the
two-part inquiry. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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Exchange question with the NASD question. 20 0 It dismissed the reasons
traditionally listed for implying a private cause of action, saying that
because of the new and proper "restrictive approach to implying private
20 1
rights of action," the old reasons are no longer valid.
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the NASD rules, an issue directly
parallel to the failure to supervise claim. 20 2 After casting away any claim of
an explicit remedy in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the court denied the
petitioners' argument that "a private right is implicit because § 15A(b)(6) of
the Securities Exchange Act ... establishes an actionable duty under §
27."203 Additionally, the court found it compelling that there was no
explicit provision granting a cause of action, especially because other parts
of the Exchange Act specifically provide for such. 20 4 Instead, Jablon cited
language of Touche Ross and Transamerica: "Our conclusion that neither §
6(b) nor § 15A(b)(6) provides private rights of action is further supported
by the fact that sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18 of the Securities Exchange Act
explicitly provide private rights of action. '20 5 The Jablon court noted that
the Supreme Court itself refused to imply a remedy into section 17(a) of the
Act because "'when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy,
20 6
it knew how to do so and did so expressly.'
Thus, under the test laid down by Jablon, failure to supervise claims
would fail because of a lack of congressional intent to create a private right
and, even if this problem could be sidestepped, the claimant would still bear
the burden of proving that the NASD intended to create this right upon
enactment of the rule. 20 7 There is no support for a finding that this result is
what the NASD intended by promulgating Conduct Rule 3010.
d. The Court Restricts TraditionallyImplied Actions
The Supreme Court took the argument even further in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.20 8 By sounding the death knell
for the long-established practice of implying a private cause of action in
relation to aiding and abetting, the Court instead trumpeted a new era of
adhering to strict textualism even in the face of equity and policy

200. Id.
201. Id. After establishing that the only determinative factor is congressional intent, the
Court found that a private cause of action could not be implied "[blecause we find no
[ciongressional intent to provide a private action for violation of stock exchange rules." Id. at
681.
202. See id.
203. Id.
204. Id. This is a common principle in law known as expressio unius est exclusio
alterius-"To express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the
alternative." Blacks's Law Dictionary 687 (8th ed. 2004).
205. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 681.
206. Id. (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979)).
207. Id. at 679.
208. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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arguments.2 0 9 The Court recognized that "[t]he issue, however, is not
whether imposing private civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy
but whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute." 210 The Court, in
an argument that applies to secondary liability for failure to supervise, in
addition to the aiding and abetting issue that the Court was addressing,
noted that "Congress did not overlook secondary liability when it created
the private rights of action in the 1934 Act. Section 20 of the 1934 Act
imposes liability on 'controlling person[s]. ' ' ' 2 11 This is particularly
important because it "suggests that '[w]hen Congress wished to create such
[secondary] liability, it had little trouble doing so.' ... The fact that
Congress chose to impose some forms of secondary liability, but not others,
indicates a deliberate congressional choice with which the courts should not
21 2
interfere."
Even the dissent,2 13 which was not willing to dismiss precedent allowing
private liability for aiders and abettors, recognized the danger that the
decision posed for implying any form of secondary liability, such as the
failure to supervise. 2 14 The dissent noted that if not for the stare decisis
argument, "[m]any of the observations in the majority's opinion would be
persuasive. '2 15 This was because the "approach to implied causes of
action... has changed markedly since the Exchange Act's passage in
1934. ... [C]ourts regularly assumed... that a statute enacted for the
benefit of a particular class conferred on members of that class the right to
sue violators of that statute." 2 16 Thus, CentralBank requires application of
the congressional intent test of Touche Ross even for well-established areas
2 17
of law that had always implied private causes of action.
e. Cases Relating to Arbitration that Argue Denying a Remedy Is Required
in Arbitration
Although courts have generally held that failure to supervise claims are
arbitrable, 218 arbitrators have acted as gatekeepers by granting dismissal
motions 2 19 on the grounds that claimants' private causes of action are for
209. See id. at 187-88.
210. Id. at 177.
211. Id. at 184.
212. Id. (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The decision was a 5-4 split.
214. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The majority gives short shrift to a long history of aider
and abettor liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and.., its rationale imperils other wellestablished forms of secondary liability not expressly addressed in the securities laws ... .
215. Id. at 195.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 (2001).
218. See supra Part I.B.5.

219. "The courts have upheld arbitrators granting of dismissal motions ... on the grounds
of the timeliness of the claims, a respondent's involvement in the matter in controversy, or
whether the claimant has a private right of action for alleged violation of an SRO rule." U.S.
Gen. Accounting Office, Follow-up Report on Matters Relating to Securities Arbitration 8
(2003).
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alleged violations of SRO rules. 22 0 Therefore, while arbitration has
provided an outlet for these claims to be raised, they have not provided an
outlet for the claims to be sustained. 22 1 Thus, in litigation the courts have
overwhelmingly denied private remedies, while even in arbitrations,
although claims are technically allowed in the door, they are often
222
dismissed as a matter of course.
2. Denying a Private Remedy Is Sound Policy
While the Supreme Court has espoused a textualist approach in recent
years that essentially forecloses arguments for implication, 223 the policies
that drive these arguments are still important. 224 Over time the makeup of
the Court may change, leading to different views on the issue. 225
From a policy standpoint there are several reasons why there should not
be an implied private cause of action. First, implication of remedies
involves the courts usurping the role of Congress in promulgating laws. It
allows the courts to reshape laws to mean not what they say, but rather what
they might have said otherwise. 226 Second, even if the private action
remedy was explicit in the statute, and thus clearly existed, that may not
mean that the existence of the right was good policy. 227 There is a concern

that allowing private remedies would lead to increased litigation,
particularly frivolous litigation, in attempts to garner settlements. 2 28
Congress has repeatedly warned of the danger of allowing that to happen. 2 29
Lastly, there should not be a private cause of action because the remedy is
220. See, e.g., Sears v. Nirenberg, No. 99-02955, 2000 NASD Arb. LEXIS 782, at *7
(Jan. 21, 2000) ("The NASD Rules of Fair Practice do not contain a private right of action
and thus the Panel finds in favor of Respondents based on allegations of a per se violation of
those rules.")
221. Id.
222. See Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Although
NASD's procedural rules do not specifically address whether an arbitration panel has the
authority to dismiss facially deficient claims with prejudice based solely on the pleadings,
there is no express prohibition against such a procedure."); see also Warren v. Tacher, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 600, 602 (W.D. Ky. 2000) ("Courts have recognized the authority of NASD
arbitrators to decide pre-hearing dismissals for failure to state a claim under the NASD
Code."); Prudential Secs., Inc. v. Dalton, 929 F. Supp. 1411, 1417 (N.D. Okla. 1996)
(allowing dismissal of claims if no relief can be granted).
223. See supra Parts II.A. 1.
224. For examples of the countervailing arguments, see infra Part II.B.3.
225. Some courts have already tried abandoning the textualist approach. See James N.
Benedict, Recent Developments in Litigation under the Investment Company Act of 1940, in
Practising L. Inst., Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series 1192 (2004). In
Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), "the
court considered the question of whether implied rights of action still existed ... in light of
Central Bank. In finding that such rights did exist, the court ignored the Supreme Court's
marked aversion toward implied rights." Benedict, supra note 225, at 1192.
226. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
227. For policy reasons not to allow a private remedy for failure to supervise, see infra
Part II.A.2.b-c.
228. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
229. See infra note 248.

20051

SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL

unnecessary. 230 There are currently sufficient deterrents placed in front of
broker-dealers to encourage compliance and sufficient avenues by which
23 1
harmed investors can be made whole.
a. Courts Are Usurping the Role of Congress
The first policy argument is that the courts are overstepping their bounds
when they try to reinterpret Congress's intentions. 232 This is not a novel
argument and has divided the courts since their inception. 233 Article I of
234
the U.S. Constitution vests legislative power exclusively in Congress.
American politicians as far back as Alexander Hamilton envisioned "that
the judiciary would be the 'weakest' branch of government." 235 According
to Thomas Jipping, 236 a judge's role is to interpret the law, not inject
Congress's intent into the law. 23 7 Jipping contrasts the activist judge, a
rising threat in his view, with the restrained judge, the paradigm of proper
judicial response. 238 Thus "[t]here exist two basic choices, a restrained
judge who is a servant of the law, or an activist judge who is the master of
the law." 2 39 As a practical matter, Jipping contrasts the activist judge with
the restrained, argues as follows:
A restrained judge believes that the meaning of these words already
exists, that the meaning came from the legislatures or the people who
enacted those words into law in the first place, and the judge's job is to
find it. Activist judges, in contrast, pursue their own24agendas
and believe
0
they can give those words any meaning they choose.
More critically, he states that "[a] restrained judge takes the law as he finds
it, while the activist judge believes he can make it up as he goes along,
24 1
usually as a way of reaching the results he wants."
Alexander Hamilton explained the need for judges to act in a restrained
manner: "if [judges] should be disposed to exercise will instead of
judgment, the consequences would equally be the substitution of their
230. See infra Part II.A.2.c.
231. See infra Part II.A.2.c.

232. Thomas L. Jipping, Disorder In The Court:

Activist Judges Threaten Justice,

http://www.leaa.org/Shield%202000/activistjudge.html (last visited July 2, 2005). Jipping is

the Director of the Free Congress Foundation's Judicial Selection Monitoring Project in
Washington, D.C. Id.
233. Id. The issue of judicial activism has been the subject of much debate lately. See
Janine DeFao, JudicialActivism on the Docket at Stanford Event, S.F. Chron., Oct. 24, 2004,

at A7. "President Bush has cited 'activist judges' in Massachusetts who declared same-sex
marriage constitutional as the reason he backs a constitutional amendment that limits
marriage to a man and a woman." Id.
234. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
235. Jipping, supra note 232.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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pleasure to that of the legislative body. ' 24 2 Therefore, in order to maintain
the integrity of our American legal system, which prides itself on the
separation of powers, we must adopt a strict textualist approach and refrain
from implying a private cause of action for violations of NASD rules.
b. Allowing a PrivateRemedy Leads to Frivolous Litigation
The second reason that is given for not creating a private cause of action
is that doing so may be poor economic policy. 243 In contrast to the
textualism argument, which passes no judgment on the substantive policy
question of what Congress should do on the issue, but instead takes offense
to the judiciary branch overstepping its bounds, 244 the second reason attacks
the merits of creating a private remedy.
Policy, particularly that which has driven congressional action, may
dictate that no right of private remedy should exist due to the fear of
excessive frivolous litigation.
In 1995, the Senate Subcommittee on
Securities found that there were high numbers of frivolous securities suits
being filed in hopes of achieving a quick settlement. 245 These suits increase
costs of capital 246 and can also have a chilling effect on investing. 2 47 If
private individuals are permitted to bring actions in the limited number of
arguably justified cases, it may open the floodgates for numerous frivolous
lawsuits. 248 Such frivolous lawsuits are particularly insidious with regard
to securities because even if the threat of liability is remote, the potential
liability is so large as to spur settlement. 249 Chairman Alfonse D'Amato
stressed this, recognizing that "the threat of such liability often forces
innocent 'deep pocket' defendants to settle frivolous suits." 250 Arthur
Levitt, then-Chairman of the SEC, added that "there is a danger that weak
claims
may
be
overcompensated
while
strong
claims
are
undercompensated.,, 2 5 1 The Committee considered amending the Exchange
242. Id. (citations omitted, alteration in original).
243. See infra notes 245-53 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
245. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
246. In 1992 and 1993, 145 such cases were settled for total payments of three billion
dollars. William S. Lerach, The Implications of the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act:
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-27 Months Later, 76 Wash. U. L.Q.
597, 600 (1998). In her testimony to the Subcommittee on Telecommunication and Finance
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Professor Janet Cooper Alexander stated
that there "is a serious question whether the benefits, in the form of deterrence ... justify
the[] costs." Id.
247. See id. (explaining the high cost of settlement for strike suits).
248. See id. Frivolous litigation, or "strike suits," have been a particular concern in the
area of securities. Kevin P. Roddy, Eight Years of Practiceand Procedure Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in Postgraduate Course in Federal Securities Law:
Current Developments 141, 147 (Am. Law Inst. 2004). (explaining the need for enactment
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
249. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995) (explaining the need for private securities litigation
reform).
250. Id. at 7.
251. Id.
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Act of 1934 to include private causes of action for aiding and abetting,
252
expressly overruling Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank.
After much deliberation and hearing testimony both for and against
amending the Act, the Committee decided not to add the express provision
because it "would be contrary to [section] 240's goal of reducing meritless
securities litigation.

'25 3

c. No Private Remedy Is Needed Because Adequate Deterrences and
Alternate Remedies Exist
The final policy reason for denying the creation of a private remedy is
that doing so is superfluous. There are already adequate remedies available
for investors that have kept investor confidence in the markets high enough
254
to withstand every dip that they have encountered since the Depression.
"The securities laws generally provide adequate remedies for those
injured .... -"255
Thus, additional remedies would be unnecessary.
Remedies already available include common law respondeat superior and
controlling-person liability.
Respondeat superior liability has a long history in tort law. 256 The
underlying premise of respondeat superior is that "[a] master is subject to
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of
their employment. '25 7 The traditional interpretation of respondeat superior
provides that a "broker-dealer could be held vicariously liable for the
wrongful acts of its representatives." 258 Under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, there is no good faith defense. 259 Thus, with respondeat superior
already protecting investors' rights, there is no need for further legislation.
Controlling-person liability stems from section 15 of the Securities
Act 2 60 and section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 26 1

As a matter of law,

252. Id. at 19.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. (statement of Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman of the SEC).

256. See Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 N.W. 643, 646 (N.D. 1926).
257. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(1) (1958).
258. See Johnson, supra note 23.
259. This has been the traditional view. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,
198 (1917).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2000). The statute states as follows:
Every person who ... controls any person liable under sections 77k or 77i of
this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe
in the existence of the fact by reason of which the liability of the controlled person
is alleged to exist.

Id.
261. 15 U.S.C. §78t(a). The statute states as follows:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person ...
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broker-dealers are controlling persons. 26 2 Because of this theory, brokerage
firms have been forced to defend charges against controlling persons when
they have failed to adequately supervise. 26 3 Although the courts are split on
what level of participation is needed for a controlling person to be held
liable, 264 the prevailing theory is that a plaintiff only need allege that the
controlling person "had the power or ability to control the [controlled
person]. "265 This is the equivalent of a private cause of action for failure to
supervise and is defensible by a showing of good faith. 266 A showing of
good faith is essentially a showing that the proper supervisory systems were
in place. 267 With the protection of controlling-person liability already in
place, it becomes unnecessary to create a new cause of action.
While there have been calls for implying private rights of action in the
2 68
wake of Enron and in the legislative history for Sarbanes-Oxley,
Congress's election not to include an explicit private action remedy in the
text of Sarbanes-Oxley is indicative of a desire that there not be such a
remedy. 269 "The majority of the legislators who passed Sarbanes-Oxley,
however, did not accept" the need to create a remedy of private action, and
instead "appeared to militate against the expansion of implied private
actions under the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act."'270

Thus, the text of the final

version of Sarbanes-Oxley does not support private actions but, rather,

unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
Id.
262. See Gerald F. Rath et al., Selected Issues in Broker/Customer Litigation, in
Securities Litigation Planning and Strategies 133, 210 (Am. Law Inst, 2004) (citing
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990)).
263. See Johnson, supra note 23; see also Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974
F.2d 873, 887 (7th Cir. 1992) (failing to grant a motion of summary judgment for a
brokerage firm accused of acting as a controlling person despite the firm having no
knowledge of the employee's actions).
264. Some courts require actual control. Compare Harrison,974 F.2d at 881 (requiring
no culpable participation, only ability to control), with Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085
(2d Cir. 1974) (requiring a showing that the controlling person was "'in some meaningful
sense [a] culpable participant[] in the fraud perpetrated by [the] controlled person[]"'
(quoting Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973))).
265. See Johnson, supra note 23; see also Stavroff v. Meyo, No. 95-4118, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32774 (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1997); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 949 (7th
Cir. 1989); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1975).
266. See Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1979).
267. Id. at 394. To prove one acted in good faith, "the controlling person [must] show
that some precautionary measures were taken to prevent an injury caused by an
employee.... It is required of the controlling person only that he maintain an adequate
system of internal control, and that he maintain the system in a diligent manner." Id. (internal
citations omitted); see also Hollinger,914 F.2d at 1576 (holding that in order to prove good
faith a broker-dealer must prove that "its supervisory system was adequate and that it
reasonably discharged its responsibilities under the system").
268. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 204.
270. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 156, at 776, 781 (discussing the impact of
Sarbanes-Oxley on private actions).
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explicitly states 27that
"[n]othing in this section shall create a new, private
1
right of action."
B. Reasonsfor Allowing a PrivateRight of Action for Violation of NASD's
Failureto Supervise Rule
There are several justifications for permitting a private right of action for
failure to supervise. Several courts, although admittedly few since 1977,
would allow implying the cause of action. 2 72 Also, the NASD has
embraced the cause of action under the penumbra of Rule 10301-a view
273
supported by the importance that courts have placed on arbitration.
Additionally, policy concerns demand implication of the right. 274 Lastly,
recent legislation paves the way for implying the private action even if it
27 5
was not there before.
1. Certain Case Law Allows for Implying a Remedy in Litigation
Prior to 1977, some courts allowed implication of private rights of action.
Although the Supreme Court has adopted a textualist approach in recent
years, it is possible that a renaissance of legal doctrine that embraces
legitimate policy concerns over literalism could return. 27 6 Thus, this
section analyzes the pre-1977 decisions.
In Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,277 rather than using a strict
textualist approach, Judge Friendly advocated a case-by-case approach,
recognizing that "[t]he case for implication would be strongest when the
rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law." 278 In Buttrey
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.27 9 the court implied a private
cause of action holding that a violation of the rule would be actionable
under the "public protection function." 2 80 Under either Buttrey28 1 or
Colonial Realty,282 a remedy for failure to supervise might be implied. The
283
circuit splits were settled with the decision in Cort v. Ash.

271. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(804) (2004).
272.
273.
274.
275.

See
See
See
See

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

II.B.1.
II.B.2.
II.B.3.a-d.
II.B.3.e.

276. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (detailing how some courts have rejected
the textualist approach).
277. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966).
278. Id. at 182.
279. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969).
280. Id. at 141.

281. Under the logic of Buttrey, one argument could be that the failure to supervise rules
were promulgated to protect the investing public.
282. Arguably, there is no other common law duty governing failure to supervise. See
infra notes 316-23 and accompanying text.
283. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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Even following the Supreme Court's ruling in Cort, which laid out four
factors for consideration, 284 implying a cause of action may arguably still
be permitted. Based on the aforementioned criteria, a private cause of
action arguably should be implied for violation of the failure to supervise
rule. 285 The securities acts, upon which a failure to supervise claim is at
287
least tangentially based, 286 were designed for the protection of investors.
Although there appears to be no textual indication of support for implying
the private action, doing so is "consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme," 288 namely, to bring about fair securities exchanges
and protect investors. 289 Lastly, the cause of action is not "one traditionally
relegated to state law," 290 because Congress specifically enabled private
29 1
causes of action in numerous parts of the securities acts.
Advocates for not implying a private remedy argue that violations of
SRO rules should be held to a more exacting standard due to the tenuous
nexus between SRO rules and an explicit statute from which a cause of
action could be implied. 292 This argument was undercut by a court's
decision that noted the "federal duty" imposed upon a broker-dealer "to
supervise" its representatives "derives from 15 U.S.C. § 78o."293
284. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
285. See infra notes 286-91 and accompanying text.
286. Cf Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Securities
Regulation-Federal,supra note 94, § 1605.
287. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
288. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
289. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
290. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
291. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2000) ("Any
person who shall make... any statement ... which ... was at the time..

.

false or

misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person.., who... shall
have purchased or sold a security.., for damages caused by such reliance ....
");id. § 78i
("Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of subsection
(a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any person... injured [for] damages
sustained as a result of any such act or transaction"). Since Congress created a federal
private cause of action in the context of securities regulation, it cannot be said that securities
regulation is "relegated to state law." Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
292. See supra notes 189-206 and accompanying text.
293. State v. Justin, 3 Misc. 3d 973, 1000 (Sup. Ct. Erie County N.Y. 2003) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 78o-4 (2000)). Section 78o of the statute states as follows:
(4) The [SEC], by order, shall censure, place limitations on the activities,
functions, or operations of, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or
revoke the registration of any broker or dealer if it finds... that such [penalty] is
in the public interest and that such broker or dealer, whether prior or subsequent to
becoming such, or any person associated with such broker or dealer, whether prior
or subsequent to becoming so associated-..
(E) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured
the violation by any other person of any provision of the Securities Act of 1933 [or
certain other federal statutes], this chapter, the rules or regulations under any of
such statutes .... or has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing
violations of the provisions of such statutes, rules, and regulations, another person
who commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision.
For the purposes of this subparagraph (E) no person shall be deemed to have
failed reasonably to supervise any other person, if-
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2. Case Law Allows a Private Remedy in Arbitration

NASD Rule 10301 and courts' application of the rule support implying a
private cause of action. Rule 10301, which dictates under what conditions a
claim may be brought in arbitration, 294 are broad enough to encompass
violations of NASD rules, that is, failure to supervise claims. In IFG
Network Securities, Inc. v. King,295 the court analyzed whether a claim of
negligent supervision can "arise[] in connection with the business activities
of [an] NASD member." 296 Citing a long string of cases, 297 the court found
that a "claim of negligent supervision satisfies the... NASD arbitration
requirement. '29 8 The court held that "[ilnasmuch as the NASD Code of
Conduct requires [broker-dealers] to supervise its registered representatives,
this Court finds that the... claim has a 'sufficient nexus' to [defendant's]
business activities so as to entitle.. . arbitration in conformance with the
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure." 299 Under this standard, then, the
NASD rules regarding arbitration have already created a private cause of
action for failure to supervise claims.
3. Policy Concerns Require a Private Remedy
Aside from the question of whether a cause of action already exists, there
are several very strong policy reasons that would dictate that a private right
of action should be created if it were deemed to not already exist. The
reasons can be categorized under five broad headings: (1) tort principles
allow it;300 (2) allowing private rights of action deters secondary actors
from contributing to improper activities; 30 1 (3) without it, plaintiffs will be
left without recourse, a dangerous proposition that might lead to an overall
lack of confidence in the market; 30 2 (4) implying the remedy is consistent

(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for applying such
procedures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect, insofar as
practicable, any such violation by such other person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent
upon him by reason of such procedures and system without reasonable cause to
believe that such procedures and system were not being complied with.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(e).
294. See supra notes 126-50 and accompanying text.
295. 282 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
296. Id. at 1356.
297. Id. at 1356-57 (citing Vestax Sec. Corp. v. McWood, 280 F.3d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir.
2002) "'A dispute that arises from a firm's lack of supervision over its brokers arises in
connection with its business."' Id. at 1356 (quoting Vestax Sec. Corp., 280 F.3d at 1082);
John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d 48, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); First
Montauk Sec. Corp. v. Four Mile Ranch Dev. Co., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1379 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (same).
298. IFG Network Securities, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1356.
299. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted).
300. See infra Part II.B.3.a.
301. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
302. See infra Part II.B.3.c.
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with the intent behind allowing the existence of SROs; 303 and (5) recent
30 4
legislation shows that Congress wants a private remedy.
a. Tort Policies Favor Implying a Private Remedy
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cort, judges had relied on tort
law to imply private rights of action. 30 5 The first federal district court to
recognize a private implied remedy did so based on the "tort maxim of ubi
jus ibi remedium-where there is a right there is a remedy. ' 30 6 Although
the Court in Cort dismissed this theory in favor of the stricter four-factor
test,30 7 the reasons for abandoning this trend might be oversimplified. That
a right may not be listed explicitly may not automatically indicate that
Congress did not want it to exist; Congress may have concluded that tort
policy would obviously have been interwoven. 30 8 The Court itself, in
Touche Ross, indicated that silence on the issue in the text is not
conclusive. 30 9 Thus a return to tort policy, a sound system that places the
3 10
costs on the cheapest cost avoiders, may be needed.
b. A PrivateRemedy Is a Necessary DeterrentAgainst Impropriety
Another reason in favor of allowing private causes of action is that it acts
as a deterrent against improper activities. "Private actions under Sections
10(b) and 14(a) of the Exchange Act have long been recognized as a
necessary supplement' to actions brought by the Commission and as an
'essential tool' in the enforcement of the federal securities laws. ' 3 11 This is
3 12
due to a lack of Commission resources:

303. See infra Part II.B.3.d.

304. See infra Part II.B.3.e.
305. See David J. Baum, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: PrivateAiding and
Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 1817, 1852

(1995) (citing Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Daniel R. Fischel,
Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 80, 80

(1981).
306. Baum, supra note 305, at 1821 (citing Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513) (internal citations

omitted).
307. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
308. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940) (noting that

existing theories must be allowed because "[t]he power to enforce implies the power to make
effective the right of recovery.... And the power to make the right of recovery effective
implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions normally available to the litigant

according to the exigencies of the particular case").
309. Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979); see also supra notes
73-74 and accompanying text.

310. For a discussion of the cheapest cost avoider theory of tort liability, see G. Calabresi
& J.T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
See also S.G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost Avoider, 78 Va. L.

Rev. 1291 (1992).
311. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 37 (1995), as reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 715-16.
312. Id.
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Because the Commission does not have adequate resources to detect
and prosecute all violations of the federal securities laws, private actions
perform a critical role in preserving the integrity of our securities
markets.... [P]rivate actions also provide a 'necessary supplement' to the
Commission's own enforcement activities by serving to deter securities
law violations. Private actions are crucial to the integrity of our
disclosure system because they provide a direct incentive for issuers and
other market participants to meet their obligations under the securities
laws.

313

The need for private rights of action is growing more essential and its
importance is likely to increase, given the budgetary constraints on SEC
resources. 3 14 The Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement testified
that "[g]iven the continued growth in the size and complexity of our
securities markets, and the absolute certainty that persons seeking to
perpetrate financial fraud will always be among us, private actions will
continue to be essential to the maintenance of investor protection." 3 15 The
same logic is applicable for violations of NASD rules, particularly the
failure to supervise.
Without a private cause of action specific to failure to supervise claims,
harmed investors would not be sheltered under either respondeat superior or
the controlling-person doctrine. Respondeat superior liability traditionally
did not contain a good faith defense, but this has been challenged by the
Third Circuit's holding that in a securities setting respondeat superior is
only imposed when a high level of public trust in the broker-dealer
exists. 3 16 Thus a separate private remedy is needed to impose a fiduciary
duty on broker-dealers to adequately supervise their employees. The
question of whether respondeat superior is a remedy sufficient enough in
scope as to make an explicit failure to supervise claim unnecessary is
muddled further by the disagreement among the courts as to whether the
controlling person provisions of the Exchange Acts preclude raising
respondeat superior claims. Some courts have held that respondeat superior
is inapplicable to brokerage firms because "Congress intended to supplant,
rather than expand, common law liability when it enacted section 20(a) of
the 1934 Act."'3 17 Following the Central Bank decision, in which the

313. Id. at 37-38 (Senators Paul S. Sarbanes, Richard H. Bryan, and Barbara Boxer, citing
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance on February 10, 1995).
314. Id. at 38. This argument may have been somewhat blunted because the SEC has
recently received a large appropriation for increasing their enforcement staff. Securities
14,
2003),
Release
(Feb.
SIA
Press
Industries
Association,
http://www.sia.cornpress/2003-press-releases/ htmlI/prjy_03.html.
315. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 38, as reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 715-16.
316. See Rath et al., supra note 262, at 210 (citing Ash v. Ameritreat, Inc., 189 F.3d 463
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that where employees acted without involvement by employers no
fiduciary duty existed between employers and customers)).
317. Johnson, supra note 23 (citing Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 667
(9th Cir. 1978)).
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dissent warned that respondeat superior liability may be dead, 3 18 there is an
319
even greater need for an explicit cause of action.
The concerns voiced in Central Bank's dissent were not limited to
respondeat superior, but warned of challenges to controlling-person liability
as well. 320 Even if controlling-person liability has survived, it is unclear
how well it protects the interests of someone covered by an express remedy
granting failure to supervise liability. Controlling-person liability contains
a good faith defense, 32 1 an escape route not necessarily available under the
failure to supervise rule. Controlling-person liability must be derivative and
can only be brought if there is an underlying violation by a controlled
person. 322 It is unclear whether such a standard exists for failure to
supervise. Thus the threat of respondeat superior liability, which may have
been preempted, and of controlling-person liability, which is comparatively
toothless, are insufficient as deterrents to compel firm compliance with
NASD supervisory rules, and thus do not preclude the need to promulgate
3 23
an explicit cause of action for violation of the failure to supervise rule.
c. A Private Remedy Is Needed to ProtectInvestor Confidence
Thus, without a private cause of action, the only way to enforce the
NASD supervisory rules is for the SEC to bring suit. Given the
aforementioned lack of funds, 32 4 it seems foolhardy to abandon an
enforcement tool deemed "essential to the maintenance of investor
protection." 325 No empirical data is needed to deduct that the existence of a
private cause of action for failure to supervise will prompt increased
supervision of brokers by the broker-dealer firms.
Without the deterrents in place there is a high risk of violations. These
violations could lead to a decrease in investor confidence. 3 26 Senators Paul
S. Sarbanes, Richard H. Bryan, and Barbara Boxer, commenting on the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, stated that "[t]he Federal
securities laws generally provide for sensible regulation, and selfregulation, of exchanges, brokers, dealers and issuers," and are "the largest
and most vibrant in the world," but recognized that investor confidence in
the market is needed. 327 "[I]nvestor confidence" is "important to... the
318. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.

319. This need for the explicit cause of action is to accomplish the policy goals listed
supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
322. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 669 (7th Cir. 1998).
323. See supra notes 314-22 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
325. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 38 (1995), as reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 716.
326. This would undermine the entire purpose of the Exchange Acts, enacted "[d]uring
the Great Depression ... to promote investor confidence in the United States securities
markets and thereby to encourage the investment necessary for capital formation, economic
growth, and job creation." Id. at 4, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683.
327. Id. at 37, as reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 715.
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success of our markets.... That confidence is maintained because investors
know they have effective remedies against persons who would defraud
them." 32 8 This acknowledgement is bipartisan: "Both Republican and
Democratic Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission have
stressed the integral role of the private right of action in maintaining
investor confidence. 3 29
d. Implication Bolsters the Intent Behind SROs
Some authorities assert that implying private rights of action is consistent
with the intent behind the establishment of SROs. 3 30 If the entire purpose
of having SROs was to protect investors, then it makes sense to imply a
private remedy because "[t]he prospect of liability would probably have a
substantially greater in
terrorem effect on members than the prospect of
' 33 1
internal discipline. "
328. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 715.
329. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 715.
330. Note, Private Actions As a Remedy For Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 825 (1970) (championing implying private rights of action for violations of
NASD rules that promote investor protection). The authors of the note claimed that the
primary purpose of allowing a self-regulatory scheme was investor protection. Id. at 827.
The authors considered particularly problematic that there was an "inadequacy of formal
remedies for customers injured by violation of exchange rules." Id. at 828-29.
331. Id. at 829. The Note discussed several justifications implying a private remedy.
First, under a tort-negligence scheme, it makes sense that if a rule, in the court's
determination, was promulgated to protect investors, then a remedy should be implied based
on negligence. Id. at 837. If the "risk of investor harm [was] serious enough to justify the
imposition of a burden upon themselves," then failure to adhere to the protective rule
constitutes negligence of the kind to make the broker-dealer liable under tort maxims. Id.
The problem with founding a theorem of liability on this principle is that it allows
introduction of tort defenses, for example contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Id.
at 839. This is counterproductive because "one of the purposes of the securities acts was to
protect the public from its own ignorance and gullibility. It should not be open ... to
offset... failure to conform to the rules by pointing out that [the] customer had been
negligent in" allowing the violation. Id. A second regimen under which liability could exist
is contract law. Using the theory of an implied contract would lead to over-exclusive
liability because it would encompass rules not intended to protect customers. Id. Using the
doctrine of third-party beneficiary analysis is more appropriate to allow implication of a
right. Id. Because SRO's require members to obey rules, and because third-party beneficiary
doctrine "requires an intention of the promisee-[SRO] to benefit the customer, these
contracts will serve the dual purpose of establishing liability and limiting that liability to
rules with substantive content designed for investor protection." Id. at 841 (internal citations
omitted). Unfortunately, a remedy based upon such a scheme could easily be subverted. Id.
An SRO would merely have to not require members to contract to obey organization rules,
or alternatively, make explicitly clear in the contracts that the promise to obey rules is not for
the protection of the public and specifically exclude the public as an intended beneficiary. Id.
In the end, the Note concluded that a remedy should be implied. Id.
Before a remedy can be granted, however, the court must consider the effect it will
have on self-regulation. It is possible that a private remedy, by chilling the
enthusiasm and prestige of the self-regulators, as well as by interfering with the
congressional scheme, could do more harm than good. However, this does not
appear to be a serious worry. Examination must begin with the premise that selfregulators are sincere in their desire to protect the public interest. If they are not,
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e. Recent Legislation Supports Implying a Private Right
Proponents of implying a private right of action also turn to the recent
legislation following the Enron scandal, specifically the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.332 According to Professors Lewis D. Lowenfels and Alan R.
Bromberg, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which includes additional supervisory
requirements and directs SROs to implement them, may have opened the
door for implying private actions. 333 During the House hearings that
preceded the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, several representatives
"support[ed] the enhancement of the rights of private litigants to enforce the
securities laws." 3 34 Representative Melvin Watt, in perhaps the strongest

call for allowing private actions, whether through implication or explicit
creation of a legal right, argued
there is a very important role for private litigants to enforce rights in this
context. We can't give responsibility solely to the SEC and say you have
got absolute authority to do this, and if you don't do it, then nobody is
going to have the authority to do it. Our whole accountability system in
this country is based on the rights of individuals to hold corporations and
other individuals accountable when they feel like they have been
wronged. So, at a minimum, we need to put some of those provisions in
the bill to provide for private litigants to protect their own rights, and that
335
I think is a hallmark of the way our system should work.

Watt's statement echoes several of the policy arguments made above and
shows that Congress is actively concerned about the issue of whether to
allow private actions. 3 36 Even though Watt was unable to get an explicit
remedy of private action included in the Act, Lowenfels and Bromberg
hypothesize that courts may imply private actions under the SRO rules that
have been, or will soon be, promulgated pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley
there is nothing to chill and a remedy can do no harm. Similarly, it must be
assumed that there will not be a disproportionately large number of successful
suits. A large volume of actionable rule violations, reflecting the regulators'
inability or unwillingness to make members conform to the rules, would mean that
self-regulation is not doing its job of public protection, and the primacy of the
public interest would demand a remedy. If, on the other hand, self-regulation does
an efficient job and there are only a few violations, adverse effects on the system
resulting from a judicial remedy against brokers will probably be slight. Thus, the
question is whether a private remedy-and one invoked with success only
infrequently-will have an undesirable effect upon a group of brokers who are
making a sincere and reasonably effective effort at public protection.
Id. at 842 (footnote omitted).
332. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.,
18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
333. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 156, at 776.
334. Id. at 781. Specifically supporting the enhancement or rights were Representatives
John La Falce of New York, Melvin Watt of North Carolina, and Brad Sherman of
California. Id.
335. The Corporateand Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act of
2002: Hearings on H.R. 3763 Before the Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 254
(2002).
336. See supra Part H.B.3.e.
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339

Act. 337

This would provide even more reason for implying a private cause
of action for violation of NASD Rule 3010, a rule that was significantly
affected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Additionally, at least one commentator believed that when Congress
passed the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act
of 1994 ("Telemarketing Act"), 338 it may have created a private right of
action for violation of SRO rules. 339
The theory is that "[t]he
Telemarketing Act's requirement that the SEC and SRO's promulgate rules
as part of Congress' stated intent to protect victims of telephone fraud and
the SEC's subsequent conclusion that the existing rules are sufficient to
protect victims," 340 created a private remedy in light of section 6104 of the
Act that permits a right of action by "[any person adversely affected by any
pattern or practice of telemarketing which violates any rule of the [Federal
Trade] Commission 34 1 under section 6102. ' 342
I. THERE SHOULD NOT BE A PRIVATE REMEDY FOR INVESTORS

The reasons against implying a private right of action outweigh the
reasons and policies supporting such a private right. First, there should be
no private action remedy unless specifically adopted by Congress. 343 There
is clearly no express provision granting a private cause of action in
litigation for violation of NASD Rule 3010. 344 Thus, to argue that the
remedy in litigation exists, it is necessary to imply the private cause of
action.
The Supreme Court has adopted a textualist approach in implying private
actions. 345 This is justified because of the danger the Court recognized in
allowing courts to interpret the reasoning and intent behind legislation-a
sound policy. 346 It is not the role of the courts to act where Congress has
failed. 347 Although courts have taken a more activist role over the years, it
is Congress that has the power to create laws, not the courts, or even worse,

337. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 156, at 805.
338. 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (2000).
339. Terrance S. DeWald & Amy B. Blumenthal, The Telemarketing and Consumer
Fraud and Abusive Prevention Act: Did Congress Create a Private Right of Action for

Violation of SRO Rules?, in Practising L. Inst., Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series 241 (1998).
340. Id. at 243.
341. DeWald and Blumenthal argue for extending the private action from violations
involving a "rule of the Commission" to "any rule promulgated.., under Section 6102,
including SEC and SRO rules." Id. at 247.
342. 15 U.S.C. § 6104(a).
343. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
344. See supra Part II.A. 1.c.
345. See supra Part II.A.l.b-d.
346. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 232-42 and accompanying text. A Hamiltonian interpretation of
Article I of the Constitution supports this proposition. See supra notes 233-43 and
accompanying text.

340
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arbitrators. 348 Since, when applying a strict textualist approach, there is no
basis for implying a private remedy for violation of the failure to supervise
rule, 349 one should not be implied.
Even abandoning the strict textualist approach that the Supreme Court
has used for over twenty-five years and turning to the legislative history and
congressional intent, there is not a sufficient basis for implying a cause of
action. 350 Although the legislative histories include discussion of creating
such a remedy, 35 1 the final versions of securities bills fail to include a
private remedy. 352 This was not mere oversight, for Congress has had
many opportunities to enact explicit legislation creating a private cause of
3 54
action. 35 3 The issues were discussed and eventually tabled or rejected.
If Congress intended for the right to exist it would have been forthright and
explicit. 355 "[Flailed legislative proposals are 'a particularly dangerous
356
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute."'
This argument is particularly persuasive when applied to failure to
supervise claims. If Congress decided not to create an express provision
allowing private actions to be brought for aiding and abetting, 357 a cause of
action that had traditionally been allowed due to the threat of increased
frivolous litigation, 358 then Congress would not have intended to create a
cause of action for violation of the failure to supervise rule, an NASD rule
that is only tangentially related to the 1934 Act and that has not enjoyed the
same widespread traditional protections as aiding and abetting. 35 9 The
threat of meretricious litigation is as potent with regard to failure to
supervise claims as it is to aiding and abetting claims. 360 Thus, if Congress
was unwilling to create a private cause of action for aiding and abetting for
reasons that are equally applicable to failure to supervise claims, then
prevailing policy dictates that the private action does not exist, should not
exist, and certainly should not be implied by the courts.
The courts have held that failure to supervise is an arbitrable issue under
NASD Rule 10301.361 This has the effect of creating a private cause of
action in arbitration for failure to supervise and leads to tension between the
348. See supra notes 232-42 and accompanying text. President Bush has made his stance
on judicial activism clear. See supra note 233. His stance on arbitrator activism would likely
be equivalent. Cf supra note 233 (finding the threat of judicial activists severe enough to
advocate passage of an amendment).
349. See supra notes 189-207 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Part II.A.1.
351. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
356. Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994) (quoting Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)).
357. See supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 243-53 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 144.
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outcome of decisions in arbitrations and the outcome in courts. A better
rule would limit the ability to recover using language employed by NASD
Rule 10214, the provision describing arbitration awards in employment
discrimination disputes. 362
Under this rule, "arbitrator(s) shall be
empowered to award any relief that would be available in court under the
law." 363 With such a rule in place, arbitrators would be unable to hear
claims that have been barred from courts, like private causes of action for
violation of the failure to supervise rule, which would harmonize the law
regardless of the venue used to bring forth such claims.
Aside from the desire to integrate the law of arbitration with the law of
litigation, policy dictates that a private remedy should not exist. The policy
reasons for implying a private remedy are not compelling. There are
sufficient deterrents in place that can provide protection for investors under
the current regulatory system, even if harmed investors cannot recoup
damages. 364 The SEC brings disciplinary actions and assesses large fines
for violations of the supervisory rules. 36 5 In most states there are other
methods by which a harmed investor can recover for rightful claims against
the broker-dealer. 366 If the harm occurred under the direction of the brokerdealer, recovery will be allowed under controlling-person liability. 3 67 Bluesky laws also allow the theory of respondeat superior and possibly
conspiracy and aiding and abetting. 368 Thus, a harmed investor already has
sufficient options.
Allowing the claims to be brought will have an adverse effect on the
broker-dealer industry. 36 9 The high costs of litigation and arbitration drive
many broker-dealers to settlements--even when the lawsuits are
frivolous. 370 The threat of becoming entrenched in costly and protracted
disputes is great, unless these claims are dismissed on a procedural
ground. 37 1 Even the cost of adhering to the tenets of the NASD Discovery
Guide can be unduly burdensome. These costs are then capitalized by
broker-dealers into the costs of investing, thus creating a bar to the
market. 372 Therefore, attempting to stimulate investment by championing
building
investor
confidence
is
investor
protection
and

362. NASD, Inc., Rule of Procedure 10214.
363. Id.
364. See supra notes 254-67 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 35-36.
366. See supra notes 254-67 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 517.211
(2004) (allowing private remedy for control person liability); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
581-33(A) (2004) (same); Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2004) (same); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1522(C) (2004) (providing for control person liability for violations of Va. Code Ann. § 13.1522(A)).
367. See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 254-67 and accompanying text.

369. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
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counterproductive. 3 73 The reality is that a private remedy would merely
374
raise costs without truly adding any layer of protection.
Although investors have been clamoring for increased protections in the
wake of recent accounting scandals, 375 Congress should restrain from
passing knee-jerk legislation that sweeps too broadly, ensnaring brokerdealers in a wide net, and rather should limit such laws to their true
376
purpose-ensuring that companies report accurately.
In order to ensure that arbitrators do not mistakenly award judgments on
failure to supervise, the claim should be barred from arbitration entirely.
Rather than allow the arbitrators to decide if the issue is arbitrable, the SEC
and NASD should promulgate rules that will not allow a dispute to go to
arbitration if it is based on a failure to supervise claim. Barring certain
claims from arbitration is not a novel idea. 377 The NASD already bars class
action suits from arbitration. 378 Barring failure to supervise claims will
reduce frivolous lawsuits and reestablish the SEC as the sole defender of
violations of exchange and SRO rules.
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that the SEC will take such a bold
step. 3 79 Since barring the claims seems unlikely, the NASD could take the
smaller step of requiring arbitrators to list the reasons for granting the
award. This is not entirely novel, as the rules governing employment
discrimination claims already require arbitrators to "set[] forth a summary
of the issues, including the type(s) of dispute(s), the damages or other relief
requested and awarded, a statement of any other issues resolved, and a
statement regarding the disposition of any statutory claim(s)." 380 Thus, if
arbitrators rely on the failure to supervise claim exclusively, a defendant
will at least have cause to vacate the award. Instead, it seems likely that
this legal quagmire will remain. The Supreme Court and Congress will
remain disinclined to imply a private right of action for NASD rule
violations. The NASD will allow claims in arbitration. Arbitrators will
continue to arbitrarily decide whether to dismiss failure to supervise claims
and plaintiffs will continue filing frivolous claims that grant them discovery
373. See supra notes 243-53 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 243-53 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
376. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is defined as an act "[t]o protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws." 107 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
377. NASD, Inc., Rule of Procedure 10301 (2001).
378. Id.
379. In an age of heightened investor concern following the recent Wall Street scandals
and with increased clamoring for added investor protection, it is unlikely that the SEC will
take an action that may be perceived by laymen as limiting investors' rights. For a detailed
look at the heightened concerns of the public and the reasons behind them, see Douglas L.
Keene & Rita R. Handrich, The Enron Effect: Uncertainty, Mistrust, and Cynicism, in
Advocacy Track: Communicating with the Jury-Repackaging Your Message (Ass'n of
Trial Lawyers of Am. 2003).
380. NASD, Inc., Rule of Procedure 10214.
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in both arbitration and litigation. The day of a tribunal of nonlegal
practitioners and SRO opinions trumping our most sacred Court and
Congress is upon us. Be afraid.
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